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Abstract
Modern trend sees a lot usage of honeywords (or fake password) for protecting the original passwords
in the password file. However, the usage of honeywords has strongly been criticized under the different
security and usability parameters. Though many of these issues have been successfully resolved, research in
this domain is still facing difficulties in achieving flatness (or producing the equally probable honeywords
with reference to the original password). Though recent studies have made a significant effort to meet this
criterion, we show that they either fall short or are based on some unrealistic assumptions. To practically
fulfil this flatness criterion, we propose a questionnaire-oriented authentication system based on the episodic
(or long term) memory of the users. Our study reveals that proposed mechanism is capable of generating
significantly improved flatter list of honeywords compared to the existing protocols. Subsequent discussion
shows that the proposed system also overcomes all the limitations of the existing state of arts with no lesser
than 95% goodness.
Keywords: Questionnaire based authentication, Episodic memory, Password, Legacy-UI, Honeyword.
1. Introduction
All human beings have three lives: public, private, and secret - Gabriel Garcia Marquez.
Password based authentication remains as the most popular form of identity verification because of its
high usability standard. However, different attack models have been launched over the time to diminish the
security standard far below to the desired level. In recent days, password leakage from the compromised
severs is booming gradually as the reports suggest that password breach at the server side heavily domi-
nates the other security issues on the password. For example, some recent password data breaches include
Adobe (150 million), Evernote (50 million), Anthem (40 million) (Pham, Feb.2015), RockYou (32 million)
(Davidson, Dec.2009), Tianya (30 million), Dodonew (16 million), 000webhost (15 million) (Fox-Brewster,
Oct.2015), Gmail (4.9 million) and Phpbb (255K) just to name a few. The security community has mainly
identified two factors that causing password leakage from the different servers.
1. Human chosen passwords are highly skewed. Highly skewed passwords increase the predictability,
building the success stories of the modern password cracking algorithms (Weir et al., 2009) (Ma et al.,
2014).
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2. Recent password crackers utilize GPU-based password cracking technique which reduces time complex-
ity of the password cracking to a great extent, turning the things completely in favour of the attackers.
For example, at Password’12, Gosney et al. showed that 12 hours is sufficient to brute force the entire
key space of 958 (Gosney, 2012). This infers that with the help of GPU-based password cracking, any
password of length 8 can be inverted from its hashed format within a time span of 12 hours.
For addressing (or detecting to be precise) such serious threat, in 2013, Juels and Rivest take one of the
first significant initiatives to propose the fake password (or honeyword) based framework (Juels and Rivest,
2013). Their work carries tremendous potential in handling such threat and because of this, modern days’
research shows an inclination towards honeywords in many password related domains (Juels and Ristenpart,
2014) (Catuogno et al., 2015).
To be acceptable, like other security protocols, a honeyword based authentication technique (or HBAT)
must satisfy certain security and usability parameters. Before going detail into these parameters, we first
present a brief overview of HBAT’s working principle.
1.1. Working principle of HBAT
In HBAT, along with the original password of the users, the system stores some fake passwords (or
honeywords) in the password file. The index position of the original password is maintained in another file,
belonging to a different server, known as honeyChecker. The following presents an example of this kind of
setup for the username and password as alice and alice2004, respectively.
alice2002 alice2006 alice2004
alice1998 alice2000 alice2008
In the above example, except alice2004, the others are instances of honeyword, generated by the system.
The honeywords and original password are collectively referred as sweetwords. Along with the username
(i.e., alice) the index position of the original password (here 3) is stored in the honeyChecker.
Readers can notice that a compromised password file discloses all these sweetwords to an adversary.
However, it never reveals any information about the original password. Moreover, the adversary gets con-
fused while identifying the original password of the user. On treating a honeyword as the original password
of the user, the index position of that honeyword never finds a match in the honeyChecker. In contrast,
submitted password by a legitimate user always belongs to the index position which is same as the stored
index value in the honeyChecker.
If a mismatch occurs, the honeyChecker directs a security alarm to the system administrator. On getting
a match, the honeyChecker sends a positive feedback to the system administrator, stating that the login
request can be permitted.
Therefore, a list of k sweetwords can sense the threat (i.e., password file has been compromised) with the
probability (k − 1)/k. It is important to note that HBAT works under the distributed security framework
which is assumed as much harder to compromise as a whole (Kontaxis et al., 2013) (Juels and Rivest, 2013).
Based on the presented text so far, next, we discuss the essential security and usability criteria that an
HBAT must satisfy.
1.2. HBAT security parameters
There are two well defined security parameters that an ideal HBAT must satisfy.
(a) Denial of services (DoS) resiliency.
(b) Achieving flatness.
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Initially, multiple system vulnerabilities (or MSV) considered as another important security aspect (Juels
and Rivest, 2013). However, some of the salient research in this domain has treated this with much lesser
significance (Erguler, 2016). As the name suggests, in MSV, an attacker needs to compromise a distributed
framework for threatening the security. Therefore this parameter violates the basic assumption of HBAT
(i.e., distributed security is much harder to compromise as a whole). Hence, as advised in (Erguler, 2016),
we have only considered DoS resiliency and flatness as the essential security parameters.
DoS resiliency: Knowing the original password of a user (may be after performing the shoulder surfing
attack (Kwon et al., 2014)), if an adversary can guess the stored honeywords in the password file, then
she may intentionally submit a honeyword. The system then falsely interprets that the password file has
been compromised. Under this situation, based on the normal HBAT security routine, the system denies
any further login attempt from the users and blocks all the registered users’ accounts. Chaffing methods in
(Juels and Rivest, 2013) are known to provide weak security against the DoS attack. For example, for the
original password dextra5 and k = 6, let the chaffing-by-tweaking-digit in (Juels and Rivest, 2013) generates
the following list of sweetwords
dextra2 dextra5 dextra1
dextra6 dextra8 dextra4
Therefore, knowing the original password, dextra5, an adversary can hit a honeyword with the probability
5/9. As suggested in (Bojinov et al., 2010), an ideal HBAT must take appropriate security measures to
handle this kind of threat by generating hard-to-guess honeywords.
Achieving flatness: Ideally, all k−1 honeywords, maintained against a user’s account, should look like
the original password of the user to obfuscate the attackers with the probability 1/k. A list, containing k
equally probable sweetwords is identified as the flat list of sweetwords. However, there are many issues (e.g.,
a correlation between a username and password, targeted guessing (Juels and Rivest, 2013) etc.) which
increase an attacker’s chances in identifying the original password of the users. Let the chosen username
and password by a user are alex and alex1992, respectively. It is quite clear that the username and password
in this example are correlated. Therefore, for k = 6, if a system generates following list of sweetwords based
on the modelling-syntax-approach, proposed in (Bojinov et al., 2010),
jhon2064 mery1928 tias7348
cina1990 baby2368 alex1992
then the adversary can easily identify the original password from the username alex.
A list of sweetwords, not meeting this criterion, violates the basic objective of an HBAT. Thus achieving
flatness is absolutely important for an HBAT to hold its water. Though some serious efforts have been made
to fulfill this prime security objective, most of them fall short either basis on hard to satisfiable assumptions
or because of their design.
1.3. HBAT usability parameters
Along with the aforementioned security parameters, there are following important usability specifications
which play a significant role in determining the acceptability of an HBAT.
(a) System interference.
(b) Stress on memorability.
(c) Typo-safety.
System interference and stress on memorability: These two usability specifications are comple-
mentary to each other. In their contribution in (Juels and Rivest, 2013), authors show that for satisfying
the previously mentioned security objectives, some HBAT may interfere in the password choice of the users
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and force them to remember an extra information for login. This additional information is used for gen-
erating the honeywords for such HABT. Therefore, an HBAT, having system interference, puts stress on
the users’ mind. In a nutshell, user interface (UI) of such systems tells a user about the use of honeywords
and interact with the user to influence her password choice. These systems are categorized as modified-UI
HBAT (Chakraborty and Mondal, 2017).
On the other hand, a legacy-UI HBAT does not tell the user about the use of honeywords, nor interact
with her to influence her password choice. Therefore this kind of HBAT does not have any system inter-
ference and hence puts no stress on user’s mind. It is quite intuitive (and obvious) that a legacy-UI HBAT
provides more user friendliness compared to a modified-UI HBAT and hence, an ideal HBAT should validate
the users through the legacy-UI for providing a better usability standard (Erguler, 2016).
Typo-safety: An HBAT would also like it to be rare for a legitimate user to set off a security alarm
by accidentally entering a honeyword. Typos are one possible cause of such accidents. Like in (Bojinov
et al., 2010), there are HBAT which are capable of generating quite different sweetwords from each other for
becoming more typo-safe. In contrast, chaffing methods in (Juels and Rivest, 2013) are considered as less
typo-safe and thus threat the usability standard. For example, as discussed earlier, chaffing-by-tweaking-digit
may generate following list of sweetwords for the password dextra5 and k = 6.
dextra2 dextra5 dextra1
dextra6 dextra8 dextra4
Now, while entering the digit after entering the prefix, dextra, successfully, chances of accidental submission
of honeyword will be 5/9 . Thus chaffing-by-tweaking-digit is not much typo-safe.
1.4. Motivations and Contributions
Based on the presented text so far, this section first builds the motivations behind this work and then
lists the highlights of contributions.
Motivation 1: For achieving the desired security objectives, most of the recently proposed HBAT
interfere in the password choice of the users. Therefore, the recent trend shows more inclination towards
modified-UI HBAT rather than the legacy-UI. As discussed earlier, a modified-UI HBAT not only degrades
the usability standard but sometimes it also ends up being unusable in practice (e.g., take-a-tail in (Juels
and Rivest, 2013)). Recently, based on his proposed legacy-UI HBAT, Imran Erguler has made a significant
effort for satisfying the HBAT security parameters. However, one of our contributions shows that claimed
security standard in (Erguler, 2016) is clearly overestimated and the method fails to achieve unconditional
flatness. Thus there exists a gap in achieving flatness using a legacy-UI HABT.
Motivation 2: To be acceptable, assuring user friendliness is a must criterion and password is the
highest form of authentication in providing that. Therefore, we also explore different authentication ser-
vices that accept the passwords as input and put no stress on the users’ mind. Our survey reveals that
recognition is much easier than recall (Hogan and Kintsch, 1971) (Craik and McDowd, 1987), and hence,
recognition-based authentication systems are capable of providing very high usability standard. Introduced
by Barton and Barton in 1984 (Barton and Barton, 1984), questionnaire based authentication remains as
one of the most popular recognition-based identity verification techniques till date (Masui, 2013). However,
these questionnaire based authentication services acquire large memory space for storing the necessary in-
formation on per user basis. This is considered as a major overhead to be used as a practical solution.
Motivation 3: We also believe that if a questionnaire based authentication technique is proposed based
on the memorable events of a user’s life, then recalling/recognizing those events would not put any significant
stress on that user.
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Mainly motivated by the aforementioned facts, below we present the highlights of our findings.
Contribution 1: We revisit the Imran Erguler’s approach and show that proposal in (Erguler, 2016)
clearly overestimates the security standard for achieving the flatness. Also, our analysis reveals that to meet
the claimed security standard, some of the assumptions made by the author degrades the usability standard
substantially.
Contribution 2: We propose a questionnaire based authentication system based on the episodic (or
long term) memory (Masui, 2013) of the users. Our proposal not only reduces the storage cost significantly
compared to conventional questionnaire based authentication systems but also meet the essential usability
and security criteria (including achieving flatness) of an ideal HBAT.
Contribution 3: Finally, we have performed an exhaustive experimental analysis to show that proposed
method also satisfactorily meet the conventional usability parameters (i.e., login time and error rate during
login) and hence can be considered as a deployable solution in practice.
Roadmap: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds background of our work.
Section 3 discusses how to satisfy the important security parameters of HBAT in a best possible way.
Section 4 finds vulnerabilities in a recently proposed honeyword generation approach to show that there is
a scope of improvements in this domain. Section 5 introduces the proposed mechanism. Section 6 gives an
overview of required storage to support our scheme. Following this, Section 7 and Section 8 detail about the
usability and security standard of the proposed scheme, respectively. Section 9 compares our scheme with
the most recent HBAT. Finally, Section 10 concludes the discussion.
2. Background
In spite of having other alternatives (e.g., graphical password), the users’ community largely accepts
textual password because of simple login interface and adaptability. However, unknowingly, the majority of
the users put their password at risk (Ur et al., 2016), as the chosen passwords by them are highly skewed
in nature (Wang et al., 2017) (Bonneau, 2012). The unevenness in the password dataset plays a major role
in the success stories of modern password cracking algorithms (Malone and Maher, 2012). To detect the
threat of password cracking, the honeywords have successfully been used in many scenarios (Catuogno et al.,
2015), (Juels and Ristenpart, 2014). However, most of the existing HABT, especially legacy-UI HBAT, fail
to meet flatness criterion which remains a serious concern to the security community.
The questionnaire based authentication services have a tendency of using a user’s specific information
for forming the password. Though the influence of social networks (e.g., facebook, twitter) brings a portion
of users’ private lives in public, however, we believe that a careful selection of questionnaires still refrains
the adversaries from knowing users’ passwords (by exploring their network graph). In other words, we show
that a carefully designed questionnaire based authentication system can truly mitigate the risk associated
with targeted guessing attack (Bilge et al., 2009). As targeted guessing is one of the major causes that
restricts HBAT from achieving flatness, hence, a sense of eliminating this factor can be considered as a
primary motivation behind this work.
Attempts have been made since long to design an authentication system that accepts passwords derived
from the users’ memory (Zviran and Haga, 1990). To the best of our knowledge, the contribution of Barton
and Barton was among the very first few initiatives made in this direction (Barton and Barton, 1984). In
their study, the representation of long term memory was classified into semantic and episodic and authors
showed the superiority of latter one for forming the password. Lately, the proposal from Toshiyuki Masui
explored the strength of the episodic memory in forming the passwords (Masui, 2013). Recent studies show
some shift in utilizing the users’ memory as the focus is getting more towards users’ behavior or activity for
generating the passwords (Dandapat et al., 2015) (Skracˇic´ et al., 2017).
As mentioned before, the secrecy of users’ private life has been changed drastically due to the interference
of social network. Therefore, the past studies in this domain, like in (Zviran and Haga, 1990) (Barton and
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Barton, 1984), are losing their potential of becoming the valid alternatives for incorporating the HBAT. On
the other hand, proposed methods in (Dandapat et al., 2015) (Skracˇic´ et al., 2017) − capable of providing
good security against targeted guessing attack, depend on the fragile memory of the users. For example,
the system in (Skracˇic´ et al., 2017) requires users to remember frequencies of their daily activities for
authentication. This type of login setups often increases the failure rate as some of these activities may not
be that influential. Also, the questionnaires may be of dynamic nature 1.
Notably, in (Masui, 2013), authors’ proposed system based on the episodic memory can be considered
as the closest one to our contribution. However, their approach lags in different aspects. For example, it
allows user specific questions which increase the memory overhead. Also, the selected questions may not
always defend the targeted guessing attack. Moreover, during the registration phase, a user needs to provide
the wrong alternatives for each question along with the correct answer. This may open up the door for the
adversaries as the user may casually provide any random (or non-meaningful) information while submitting
the wrong alternatives. Along with tackling all these existing issues, our proposal here incorporates HBAT
for generating the flat list of sweetwords to detect the password cracking.
3. Criteria for DoS resiliency and achieving flatness
As mentioned in Section 1.2, there are two well defined security parameters associated with an HBAT −
(a) DoS resiliency and (b) achieving flatness. Earlier, we present a brief introduction to these two param-
eters. Therefore, in this section, we mainly focus on the necessary criteria that an HBAT must satisfy for
handling these security issues.
Essential criteria for handling DoS: To be short, with the knowledge of an original password, an
adversary can only mount DoS attack if she can guess any honeyword with high probability. Therefore, a
countermeasure will be reducing this chances of guessing. Let n be the number of all possible honeywords
that can be generated from the original password. Now, if a HBAT only selects k − 1(k > 1) honeywords
to lure the attackers, then the probability of success of mounting the DoS attack becomes (k − 1)/(n− 1).
With the understanding of this, below we present the essential criterion for avoiding this attack.
Criterion 1: The value of n should be significantly larger than k so that
(k − 1)
(n− 1) yields to a very small
value.
Literature in this domain shows that because of the large value of n, modelling-syntax-approach in (Bo-
jinov et al., 2010) is DoS secure. In contrast, chaffing methods in (Juels and Rivest, 2013) provide weak
security against DoS attack as values of n and k do not differ by much.
Essential criteria for achieving flatness: As discussed earlier, to be flat, all the sweetwords must
seem like equally probable to the adversaries. But there are a few factors which create a bar.
(a) Issue related to correlational hazards: If there exists a correlation between the username and pass-
word, then an adversary can easily distinguish the original password from the list of sweetwords. For example,
if a user chooses her username and password as maradona and football, respectively, then existing legacy-UI
HBAT provide no mechanism for masking the original password.
(b) Issue related to recognizable patterns in passwords: Leaked password databases show that a large set
of users use some particular patterns in their passwords which can be related to some well defined objects
or facts. For example, bond007, james007, 007007 are some instances of the passwords which were found
to be used by many users as reported in (Burnett, Jun, 2011). The well known password patterns help an
1Before its appearance, a user cannot predict a dynamic question (Just, 2005).
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adversary in identifying the original password.
(c) Issue related to targeted password guessing: Many users have a tendency of using their personal infor-
mation for forming the passwords which can easily be gettable from their social network graphs. Therefore,
it is often possible to deanonymize the users based on their social network graph (Narayanan and Shmatikov,
2009) (Wang et al., 2016). Also, given a user’s identity, there are many ways to find biographical or demo-
graphic data about her online − by exploiting information published on social networks, for example (Bilge
et al., 2009).
All existing HBAT (including the modified-UI also) fail to achieve flatness against this attack model, as
the adversaries can distinguish the original password based on the information available in the social network.
Criterion 2: For achieving flatness, an HBAT must ensure that chosen login credentials by the users
do not face any of the above issues.
Discussion in this segment helps the readers to understand the basic requirements for satisfying the
HBAT security parameters. Based on the discussion in this section, we revisit the Erguler’s approach in
Section 4.
4. Revisiting Erguler’s Approach
The core of the Ergular’s method is to select k − 1 honeywords from the existing users’ password in the
password file. For example, system may assign following list of swettwords against a user account for k = 8
happy8 player canadian 87@lex
memory pound880 love26 123456
where 87@lex is the original password of the user and rest are the passwords of other users that are
selected as honeywords for this particular user’s account.
We believe that contribution of Erguler mainly aims to satisfy the basic usability criteria of an ideal
HBAT. Notably, using this approach, a user does not perform any additional login activity or remember any
extra information for generating the honeywords. Also, chances of accidental submission of a honeyword are
very less as the sweetwords are expected to be substantially different in structure. Therefore, this emerges
as a pretty solid approach from the usability point of view. However, we have found that claimed security
standard of the approach is questionable as it poorly copes with Criterion 1 and Criterion 2. The identified
major drawbacks of this method are listed below.
• Drawback 1: For satisfying the flatness criterion, a method must ensure that an adversary should
not have any advantage in selecting the original password from the list of k sweetwords. However,
Erguler’s approach does not fit with this always. For example, if the user selects username as alex,
then (because of the correlational hazardous) an adversary can easily identify the original password
(87@lex ) from the list of presented sweetwords in this section. Also, targeted guessing attack can
greatly help an adversary in distinguishing the original password from the list of sweetwords.
• Drawback 2: The proposal in (Erguler, 2016), in Section 5.1, shows that in a user population of size
N, if an adversary creates m+1 users’ account with a common password pZ for first m accounts, then
the password pZ has the following probability of appearing as a honeyword for (m+1)
th account
Pr(pZ ∈Wm+1) = 1− (
N −m
N
)k (1)
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where k and Wm+1 denote number of sweetwords and list of sweetwords, respectively, for the (m+1)
th
account.
This equation clearly suggests that the system selects honeywords by following the with replacement
strategy. In other words, a system can select the same honeyword multiple times. This leads towards
the following major concern
– k̂ (< k) repetition of a honeyword in the list of k sweetwords increases the probability of successful
password cracking to 1
k−k̂ and this reduces the flatness.
• Drawback 3: Many systems (e.g., gmail) restrict the users to choose an existing username. Therefore,
an adversary can get to know n usernames without even compromising the password file. As popular
passwords are more likely to use as honeywords because of their higher occurrence in the password
file, thus this facilitates the following threat.
Let us make a fair assumption that 30% of the N users select their password from the set of most
popular passwords. Let the set be denoted as Spop. It would not be unfair to assume that because of
the so many password leakages, the set Spop is known to the adversaries. Therefore, the likelihood of
none of them participates as a honeyword for the ith user account can be presented in the form of the
following equation
Pr(e(Spop) /∈Wi) = (
N − 3N10
N
)k−1 (2)
where e(Spop) denotes an element from the set Spop and Wi implies the list of sweetwords for the i
th
user.
For a standard value of k as 20 (Juels and Rivest, 2013), the above equation suggests that for a user
account, there are only 0.11% chances that none of the popular passwords from the set Spop has
been selected as a honeyword. Therefore, even if the adversary knows less than 1% of the usernames
from a population of N users, then also she can deterministically hit a honeyword for those retrieved
usernames.
The aforementioned discussion suggests that Erguler’s method provides weak security against the DoS
attack and poorly meets Criterion 1.
• Drawback 4: For refraining the users from using the common passwords, Erguler proposed that dur-
ing registration, a system may allow a password based on certain rules. For example, comprehensive8
enforces users to choose a password of length 8, containing an uppercase and lowercase letter, a symbol,
and a digit and not include a dictionary word (Kelley et al., 2012). Also, under basic16 policy, the
selected passwords by the users must hold at least 16 characters in it (Kelley et al., 2012). However,
many users struggle to create and recall their passwords under strict password-composition policies
(Shay et al., 2016). For example, reports suggest that within three months from password creation,
4.28% of users often forget those passwords, chosen according to their own conveniences (Florencio and
Herley, 2007). Therefore, for maintaining its acceptability in a wide range, a system cannot always
abide by these policies in practice.
Note 1: The above analysis shows the limitation of Erguler’s work. Also, meeting both the criteria
(Criterion 1 and Criterion 2) together is still not being achieved satisfactorily by any of the existing HBAT.
This further motivates us to propose an efficient solution that satisfies both the security objectives without
violating the HBAT usability standards.
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5. Proposed methodology
Presented text so far suggests that the amalgamation of conventional password based authentication
techniques and HBAT has failed to achieve flatness. Therefore, in this study, we explore questionnaire based
authentication technique as we believe it can satisfy few essential requirements for achieving the desired
objective. Also, questionnaire based authentication allows a user to recognize the correct alternative which
is much easier than recall (Hogan and Kintsch, 1971). Figure 1 shows the basic properties of proposed
questionnaire based authentication service. Rest of the section unfolds the following two major topics.
• How our contribution meets these properties.
• How flatness can be achieved by satisfying these properties.
Questionnaire
Question Alternatives
Based on memo-
rable event
Generic in nature
Based on share-
able secret life
Equally probable
Generated from a
finite set
Figure 1: Skeleton of our proposal for achieving flatness.
As the above figure suggests, each question must have the following 3 properties.
• Property 1: Answer of each question must be related to some memorable events.
– Objective 1:This property ensures that recalling the correct alternative does not put any stress
on the users’ mind.
• Property 2: The questions must be generic in nature.
– Objective 2: Most of the users can relate themselves to a generic question. Therefore, a generic
question set can be used to maintain the same set of question for all the users. This has a huge
impact in minimizing the storage cost (ref. to Section 6).
• Property 3: The questions must belong to the shareable secret lives of the user.
– Objective 3: This property ensures that the information related to the questions cannot be
obtained from the social network graph of the users. To be short, our system tries to meet this
property for mitigating the risk associated with the targeted guessing attack.
A person experiences lots of incidents in her life. Some of these incidents make a lasting impact on
that person’s mind (e.g., Name of the favourite teacher). Human psychology states that this unforgettable
information (or events) belongs to the episodic memory of the users. For designing our system, we use this
kind of information to meet the property 1.
For satisfying property 2, we propose a set of Q generic questions, out of which the users need to choose
and give answers for q (≤ Q) questions. As the users may sometimes feel uncomfortable in sharing their
too personal information (even with the systems), therefore, we ensure that the selected Q questions must
belong to the shareable secret life of the users and thus satisfying property 3.
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5.1. Survey for selecting the questions
Before modelling our questionnaire based authentication system, we first formed a small committee of
30 people between an age group 24 to 63. All of them were academician and some of them (17 people) were
from the human psychology background. The committee identified the events that are generic and belong
to the episodic memory of the users. The committee members also suggested that the events related to the
episodic memory can be of 3 types.
• Non shareable events: An event that cannot be shared with either a system or person. For example,
the event related to any self-committed crime.
• Partially shareable events: An event that cannot be shared with a person, but can be with a system.
For example, Name of the person you hate secretly.
• Shareable events: An event that can be shared with both the system and person. For example, Name
of your best friend in childhood?
Finally, with the consent of all 30 committee members, we select 10 most generic questions based on
the shareable secret events. As we manually examine the genericness of the questions by asking them to
the users, thus, we do not consider non shareable and partially shareable events. After selecting Q = 10
questions, we perform following two tasks.
• Task 1: We explore two popular social networks (facebook and/or twitter) of 553 users to search the
answers for the selected questions. Unsurprisingly, we find that only 2.71% users reveal the answers
for at most 2 questions out of the 10 selected questions/questionnaires by us.
• Task 2: We ask 179 people (excluding the committee members) to give answers to no lesser than
6 questions. For the questions/questionnaires presented below, Table 1 shows the genericness of the
selected questions.
List of Questions
• Q1 : What is name of your first childhood friend?
• Q2 : What is the name of the movie you first saw in a cinema hall?
• Q3 : What is the name of the doctor you visited often in childhood?
• Q4 : What is the name of your parents friend you find (or found) your close too?
• Q5 : What was your (or your closest one’s) birth time?
– (a) Morning (b) Afternoon (c) Evening (d) Night.
• Q6 : What is the last two digits of the phone number you call often?
• Q7 : What is the name of the person (except your parents) who gave you a special gift in childhood?
• Q8 : Who is your favourite teacher?
• Q9 : What was your best rank (or roll number) in school?
• Q10 : Marriage anniversary of your parents (or closest one) falls in which quarter of the year?
– (a) Jan-Mar (b) Apr-Jun (c) Jul-Sep (d) Oct-Dec.
The outcome of task 1 reflects that based on the information, available in the social network graphs of
the users, it is hard to guess the answers of the selected questions. Also, the experimental study presented
in Table 1 reflects that selected questions are truly generic and based on the episodic memory of the users.
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No. of questions Successfully answered (%) Unable to answer (%)
6 100 0
7 100 0
8 97.7 3.3
9 83.8 16.2
10 67.6 32.4
Table 1: Memorability study based on the selected questions/questionnaires.
Note 2: In a nutshell, our survey shows that selected questions by us can mitigate chances of targeted
guessing attack. It is quite intuitive that answer of these questions has very little chance of having any
correlation with the usernames. Also, the answers here do not follow any well known pattern. Therefore,
the issues related to achieving flatness will not arise in this scheme. However, for satisfying flatness criterion
completely, questionnaire based authentication system must generate a flat list of alternatives for each
question. In Section 5.2, we have tried to achieve this.
5.2. Mechanism for generating the alternatives
Figure 1 (at the beginning of Section 5) indicates that the alternatives must hold the following properties.
• Property 4: All the alternatives corresponding to a questionnaire must be equally probable from the
adversaries point of view.
– Objective 4: A set of equally probable alternatives makes it harder for the adversaries to choose
the correct alternative.
• Property 5: All the alternatives corresponding to a questionnaire must belong to a finite set.
– Objective 5: It can be noticed that a set of infinite elements (especially a set of nouns) may
contain both meaningful and non-meaningful information. Therefore, if the alternatives are cho-
sen from such an uneven set, then it would affect the flatness. On the other hand, it is really hard
to control the nature of the elements belonging to an infinite set. However, some uniformity may
be imposed on a finite set. It is quite obvious that selected alternatives from a uniform set helps
in achieving flatness. Therefore, for controlling the nature of the set, we restrict the cardinality
of the set to a finite limit. Notably, this also has a huge impact in minimizing the storage cost
(ref. to Section 6).
It can be noticed that Q5 and Q10 have predefined alternatives and the alternatives are absolutely flat.
Also, alternatives corresponding to Q6 belong to a finite range (from 00 to 99) and leak no clue about the
correct option. In contrast, rest of the questions do not have any predefined alternatives and, their answer
belongs to a set of infinite nouns. We identify these questions as b questions. For such a question, based
on the answer of a user,
• Strategy I: either the system accepts the false alternatives from the user.
• Strategy II: or the system may take the responsibility of generating the false alternatives.
However, generated alternatives by following the strategy I may not always produce flat alternatives. For
example, for the question Q2 “what is the name of the movie you first saw in a cinema hall?”, the user
may provide the correct answer and the false answer as Titanic and Spotlight, respectively. Therefore, the
system may present the questionnaire in the following form during the login period.
• What is the name of the movie you first saw in a cinema hall?
– (a) Titanic (b) Spotlight
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To identify the correct alternative, an attacker first searches the release date of these movies. Titanic and
Spotlight released in 1997 and 2016, respectively. Therefore, based on the user’s age (or otherwise) the
attacker may conclude that Titanic is the more probable answer.
As discussed earlier, while entering the false alternatives, a user may reluctantly enter any random string.
This also helps the adversary in identifying the correct answer.
Moreover, a human chosen answer and a system generated answer differ in structure. Therefore, strategy
II also fails to generate equally probable alternatives. In a nutshell, both the strategies fail to achieve the
desired objective.
It can be noticed that a b question accepts an answer in the form of an alphabet string. Even if the
answer contains digit in it (for Q2 only) the digit can be converted to an alphabet string (e.g., 10 is replaced
by ten). For generating flat alternatives for each b question, we have adopted the following strategy.
1. Instead of considering the whole answer, the system considers an alphabet from a particular index
position. Let the index be denoted as i (1 ≤ i ≤ length of the answer). The value of i may vary
depending on a question and i′s value is determined based on an experimental analysis, presented at
the end of this section.
2. System fix this alphabet as one of the d alternatives.
3. Another d−1 false alphabets are chosen from a group of equally probable alphabets (an analysis
on this is presented in this section).
4. With the question number, the system stores this d length tuple in the database.
5. At first, the system identifies the appropriate question with the help of the question number, stored in
the database. Thereafter, by treating each element of the corresponding tuple as an alternative, the
system displays the appropriate questionnaire during the login period.
6. The user needs to recognize the ith character of her answer from the set of alternatives.
For example, for Q2, if the user gives her answer as Titanic now, then for the value of i as length of the
answer (or last index ) and d = 4, the system presents the questionnaire in the following form.
• What is the name of the movie you first saw in a cinema hall? Recognize the last alphabet.
– (a) V (b) F (c) C (d) Z
System stores the information related to this questionnaire as Q2, <V, F, C, Z>. Readers can notice that if
the alternatives are equally probable, then it becomes hard for the adversary to identify the correct answer.
Hence, it eliminates the issues related to strategy I and strategy II. It is very important to note that
the alternatives are being represented in the form of alphabets. Therefore, we state that all the alternatives
belong to the finite set of 26 alphabets. Hence the property 5 is satisfied. Next, we have taken the initiatives
to satisfy property 4.
Generating flat alternatives: Previously, we mentioned that for each b question, d (> 1) alternatives
will be chosen from a group of equally probable alphabets. This also infers that there would not be much
variation among the elements belonging to the same group. However, variation among the elements belong-
ing to the different groups must be substantially high.
Figure 2 indicates this property of the group where groups are formed based on the frequencies of the
elements. The outlier shown in this figure indicates an element that falls beyond the distribution of the
groups (e.g., an element with very high frequency compared to the other elements) and hence, cannot be
incorporated in any group.
In this study, the groups have been formed based on the frequencies of the alphabets concerning to a
particular index position of the answers. Literature in the field of human psychology shows that human can
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Figure 2: Above figure shows that bars with the same color come under the same group because of similar frequencies. Outliers
are just the odd elements that cannot be fitted in any group.
quickly recall first 3 and the last letter of any alphabet string (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004). Therefore, at
first, we vary the index value among 1, 2, 3 and last. For a given dataset of answers, then we measure the
variation of alphabets for these index values. We only select that index value which gives a nice variation of
alphabets, satisfying the group property as depicted in Figure 2. A minimum number of outliers also work
in favour of selecting an index value.
Readers can notice that except Q1, the answer of each b question (Q2, Q3, Q4, Q7 and Q8) is related
to the name of a person. As the name of a person is highly influenced by the demographical information,
therefore, in our study, we only consider the names of our country people, i.e., Indian names. However, the
answer of Q1 may not always represent an Indian movie as the foreign movies are also very popular in India.
For capturing patterns in the Indian names and movie names, we take reference of two datasets. For
building the Population name dataset (related to Indian names), we collect almost 24000 sample Indian
names (both male and female) from (Deepak, 2017). On the other hand, for forming the reference dataset
for the questionnaire Q1, we collect 280 most popular Indian movie names in last 60 years and the name of
190 foreign movies that became popular in India. We name this dataset as Movie name.
Figure 3: Above figure shows frequencies of the alphabets for the Population name dataset at index position 1. The figure
suggests that most of the Indian names start with the alphabet “S”.
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Figure 4: Above figure shows frequencies of the alphabets for the Movie name dataset at index position last. The figure
suggests that most of the movie names end with the alphabet “R”.
Note that we have made the frequency analysis of alphabets for all the previously mentioned index values
for both these datasets. However, figures for all these cannot be incorporated only because of space con-
straints. For two different datasets, Figure 3 (related to Population name) and Figure 4 (related to Movie
name) here show the frequencies of alphabets for index position 1 and last, respectively. We choose these
index values as they best satisfy the group formation criteria, depicted in Figure 2.
Above figures show no existence of outliers which also motivates us for selecting these index values (i.e.,
1 and last for Population name and Movie name datasets, respectively) over the others. Based on the
obtained frequencies of alphabets shown in Figure 3 and 4, next, we focus on forming the groups. The
groups here are formed based on the Algorithm 1. The role of the each parameter used in this algorithm is
described below.
Algorithm 1: Forming Group(α, β, P , B , D)
1 initialization: curr freq ← ∞, i ← 1;
2 while (1) do
3 peak ← nextHfreq(curr freq, D);/* returns the immediate lesser value than curr freq from D */
4 base ← α% of peak ;
5 if (base − B ≤ 0) then
6 base ← 0;
7 end
8 Gi ← gFr(peak, base, D);/* returns those elements from D, frequency of which fall between peak
and base */
9 if (base := 0) then
10 break;
11 else
12 curr freq ← β% of base + P ;
13 i++ ;
14 end
15 end
• D represents a dataset comprising of alphabets along with their frequency. In this study, D have been
formed with references to Figure 3 and 4.
• α determines the lowest frequency in the group with respect to the highest frequency (i.e., peak).
• β determines a minimum frequency gap between two consecutive groups.
• P is a very small value (< 1) which is used for slightly increasing the peak for including the elements
with closer frequencies.
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• B is also a very small value (< 1) which is used in the algorithm for decreasing the base value to 0.
This parameter come into play while base value is very close to 0.
The groups returned by Algorithm 1 for the datasets − pictorially represented in Figure 3 and 4, are
shown in Table 2. It is important to note here that proposed system requires d alternatives for each
questionnaire. As the alternatives are selected from a group only, therefore, the size of each group must not
be lesser than d. We consider the default value of d as 4 here. Also, we state that based on the geographical
location, the selected index values may differ, however, the questionnaire may remain unchanged as they
are truly generic in nature.
g id E elements mean variance
Population
1 5 {A, M, P, R, S} 11.9 3.49
2 7 {B, D, G, J, K, N, V} 4.2 0.7
3 5 {C, H, I, L, T} 1.57 0.19
4 9 {E, F, O, Q, U, W, X, Y, Z} 0.34 0.08
Movie
4 5 {A, E, N, R, S} 10.3 1.03
5 7 {D, I, L, M, O, T, Y} 4.96 0.53
6 5 {G, H, K, P, U} 2.09 0.07
7 9 {B, C, F, J, Q, V, W, X, Z} 0.29 0.05
Table 2: Groups returned by Algorithm 1 with reference to the datasets shown in Figure 3 and 4. E represents number of
elements in a group. We set the values for α, β, P and B as 45, 85, 0.1 and 0.6, respectively, for the dataset shown in Figure
3. For the dataset shown in Figure 4, we set the values for α, β, P and B as 65, 85, 0.1 and 0.6, respectively.
After retrieving the alphabet from the submitted answer by a user, the system first identifies the group
to which the alphabet belongs to. For the d ’s value as 4, the system randomly chooses 4 alphabets from the
identified group, including the retrieved one. Along with the questionnaire number, the system saves these
alphabets as a tuple in the database. During login, along with the questionnaire, the system then displays
each element of the tuple as an alternative.
Note 3: Alternatives for each b question are chosen from a group of almost equally probable elements.
Thus we may claim that the alternatives will be almost equally probable from the attackers’ point of view.
Previously, it has already been discussed that except b questions, others are capable of generating absolutely
flat alternatives. Therefore, our proposal successfully holds property 4. Also, property 5 has been satisfied
early in the Section 5.2 to meet all the characteristics of the alternatives, depicted in Figure 1. Moreover,
Section 5.1 shows that our system also fulfils all the properties of questions, shown in Figure 1. Therefore,
presented text in Section 5 suggests that our proposal highly satisfies all the criteria for achieving flatness.
5.3. Registration and login procedures
In the registration phase, a user needs to answer to q questions out of Q (here 10) questions. The value of
q is predetermined and remains same for all the users. We suggest to vary q between 6 to 8 as Table 1 shows
that users perform exceedingly well to answer to this many questions. Based on the answers submitted
by the user, the system forms the tuples and saves them in the database. The user recognizes the correct
answers corresponding to the q questionnaires during login.
The users may adopt following two different login strategies for authentication purpose.
1. Naive login approach
2. Faster login strategy.
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Naive login approach: In naive login approach, a user follows the conventional login steps for authen-
tication purpose. In this process, the user first looks at a questionnaire and recognizes the correct answer.
For submitting her response, the user then enters the option, referring to the correct answer. For example,
if the user finds that option B is denoting the correct answer, then she submits B to the system. Therefore,
by following this naive strategy, the user reads each question before submitting her choice for it.
Faster login strategy: With time, a user can develop a smarter login strategy for improving her login
time. After using our system for a certain time, tmem, a user may able to remember the option sequence.
For example, for giving answer to 6 questionnaires, if the user selects the options “C ”, “C ”, “B”, “A”, “B”
and “D”, then the option sequence will be CCBABD. Now, even without looking at the questionnaires, if
the user submits this option sequence, then also the system will permit the login. In Section 7, we have
shown that the value of tmem is sufficiently less. For q = 6, Figure 5 shows an instance of the login interface.
Figure 5: An instance of the login interface for 6 questionnaires for the proposed system.
6. Analyzing the storage cost
In this section, we show that proposed strategy significantly reduces the storage cost compared to the
existing questionnaire based authentication techniques. Our study here reveals that from the saved stor-
age space, proposed system can successfully compensate the additional storage, required for incorporating
the honeywords. We denote (QBA)SC and (PQBA)SC as the required storage space for maintaining the
login credentials in a conventional questionnaire based authentication technique and proposed questionnaire
based authentication technique, respectively. Let SSC be the required memory space for maintaining a string.
Along with the d alternatives, the conventional questionnaire based authentication techniques maintain
q (user specific) questions for each user. As both the question and alternative can be treated as a string,
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username questionnaire number tuple-string
alex Q2, Q1, Q5, <A, E, R, N> <R, P, M, A> <Morning, Afternoon, Evening, Night>
Q3, Q6, Q10 <18, 19, 20, 21> <Jan-mar, Apr-Jun, Jul-Sep, Oct-Dec>
Table 3: Above table shows an entry in F1 for the username alex.
therefore, (QBA)SC can be represented in the form of the following equation.
(QBA)SC = q × SSC + q × d× SSC + 2× SSC (3)
The term, 2× SC, in Equation 3 denotes the required memory space for storing the valid option sequence
and the username. For the default value of d as 4, the above equation yields to (5q + 2) SSC.
Like in (Erguler, 2016), proposed method maintains the login credentials in two different files in a server.
We denote these two password files as F1 and F2. The information stored in F1 helps in creating the login
page for a user. Along with the username, F1 stores all the questionnaire numbers answered by the user.
The tuples for all questionnaires are treated as a single string. For the login page shown in Figure 5, Table
3 shows the contents of F1.
In F2, together with username, the system stores k option sequences, including the original one. There-
fore, each option sequence can be treated as a sweetword here. For k = 6 and the correct option sequence
as BDBAAA, below we show an instance of F2’s content.
ADBCAB BDBAAA BAADAC
DADACA CCADAA ABBBAA
As discussed earlier, following the normal HBAT routine, the index position of the original sweetword (here
2) is stored in the honeyChecker server. The information stored in F2 incurs the normal storage overhead of
HBAT and hence, (PQBA)SC is calculated based on the contents of F1 only. This is shown in Equation 4.
(PQBA)SC = SSC + SSC + SSC (4)
For any particular value of q, the proposed protocol reduces the storage overhead and this can be repre-
sented in the form of the following equation.
Saved storage space =
(QBA)SC − (PQBA)SC
(QBA)SC
× 100% (5)
Above equation yields to 90.62%, 91.85% and 92.68% for the chosen values of q as 6, 7 and 8, respectively.
The information in F2 requires (k+1)× SSC memory space for storing each user’s information. Therefore,
for default value of k as 20, as suggested by authors in (Juels and Rivest, 2013), the required memory space
would be 21SSC. Notably, the required space for storing 10 questions and the information shown in Table 2
do not depend on the population size and hence, for a large population of N = 100000, the required space
for storing this information can be treated as negligible.
Note 4: The discussion in this section shows that for considered value of q as 6, 7 and 8, the proposed
mechanism reduces the storage cost 29SSC, 34SSC and 39SSC units, respectively. However, additional space
required for incorporating the HBAT is 22SSC unit only. Therefore, storage overhead for incorporating the
honeywords can be compensated from the saved memory. In a nutshell, the proposed questionnaire based
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authentication technique saves atleast 8SSC unit of storage space (for q = 6) even after incorporating the
HBAT. Thus we may claim that compared to the existing questionnaire based authentication methods,
proposed method here incurs no additional storage cost for maintaining the sweetwords.
7. Usability analysis
Usability analysis in this section has not been confined within the HBAT usability parameters only. We
also perform an experimental analyse for capturing users’ performance during the login. The users’ perfor-
mances for both the naive login and faster login strategies have been evaluated in terms of login time and
error rate. Before going into the experimental analysis, we show how the proposed model fits with HBAT
usability parameters.
System interference and stress on memorability: Proposed method here neither interferes in the
password choice nor imposes any stress on users’ mind by forcing the users to remember any additional
information. In fact, presented scheme here encourages users to recognize (which is easier than recall) the
facts related to the episodic events of their lives. As discussed earlier, recognizing the facts from the episodic
memory is an easy task to perform. In this way, proposed questionnaire based authentication system pro-
vides adequate user friendliness by fulfilling these two criteria.
Typo-safety: For minimizing the typo rates, lead to the false detection, we encourage to generate the
option sequences (or sweetwords) which are (structure wise) substantially different from each other. To
achieve this, we first define the following term.
Definition 1: λ−different strings:Two strings of the same length are said to be λ−different, if at
least in λ occasions, two characters belonging to the same index position are different from each other.
Notably, if two strings are λ−different, then they will also be (λ − 1)−different, provided (λ − 1) ≥ 0.
However, they will not be (λ+ 1)−different.
For example, AAABBA and AAADDA are 2−different strings as alphabets belonging to 4th and 5th
index positions are different. Also, these two strings are 1−different, but not 3−different.
Proposition: If the elements of the strings belong to a set of cardinality C, then for two λ−different
strings, s1 and s2, maximum chances of typing s2 mistakenly while entering s1 (or vice versa) can be derived
as
PTyping mistake =
( 1
C − 1
)λ
(6)
Based on the proposition, we state that for achieving typo-safety, the system should generate the sweet-
words in such a manner so that all the sweetwords must be (pairwise) λ−different from each other. To meet
this objective, we have designed the Algorithm 2 based on the following functions.
• gStr(`): Returns an arbitrary string (or option sequence) of length `, constructed by using the elements
of the set {A, B, C, D}.
• add(str, Lst): Appends the string str to the list Lst.
• comp(str1, str2): For two strings str1 and str2, this function returns an integer value associated with
number of times, two alphabets belonging to the same index position do not get matched. For example,
comp(AABBCD, ABDACC) will return 4.
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Algorithm 2: Generating Sweetwords(k, λ, act ops, `)
1 initialization: no of sweetwords ← 1, add(act ops, List);/* act ops denotes the actual option
sequence*/
2 while (no of sweetwords ! = k) do
3 valid ← 1;
4 f ops ← gStr(`);
5 for (i = 1 to sizeof(List)) do
6 η ← comp(List[i], f ops);
7 if (η < λ) then
8 valid ← 0; break;
9 end
10 end
11 if (valid := 1) then
12 add(f ops, List);
13 no of sweetwords++;
14 else
15 continue;
16 end
17 end
.
For C as 4 and q as 6, 7 and 8, we choose λ’s value as 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Therefore, with reference
to these values and Equation 6, we may state that proposed method here 96.3%, 98.77% and 99% typo safe
for q’s value as 6, 7 and 8 respectively.
Experimental analysis: For analyzing users’ behaviour during login, we took help from 80 partici-
pants (23 female and 57 male). The participants were having correct-to-normal eyesight and were capable
of operating computers. The participants were selected from an age group between 19 and 67. The login
behaviour of the participants under both the naive and faster login strategies was recorded for the analysis
purpose. We varied the value of q from 6 to 8 for both these cases (q′s value was selected based on the users’
performance shown in Table 1). It is important to note that according to the report in (Teh et al., 2016),
most of the studies in this area used a test group between 11 and 25, while very few used a test group of 50
or more participants (Kambourakis et al., 2016). Therefore, we believe that a set of 80 participants provides
a better insight about the proposed scheme.
At the beginning, we presented the basic motivation behind our work to the participants. We uploaded
our scheme to the participants’ laptops for training purpose. For each value of q, then we followed the steps,
mentioned below.
• Demonstration of Naive strategy: We first showed the registration process and the login process
using the naive approach.
• Practice and use: Participants were asked to register into our system. We then gave them time for
training purpose. This intention behind this was to allow the participants to become habituated with
our scheme.
• Data collection I: After 2 days, we collected the test data in our laboratory for capturing the login
time and error rate. We denote the login time and error rate obtained in this phase as the initial login
time error rate, respectively.
• More practice and use: We gave the participants another 5 days for training purpose for improving
their performance.
• Data collection II: After 5 days, we again collected the test data. We denote the login time and
error rate obtained in this phase as the posterior login time and error rate, respectively.
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• Demonstration of Faster login strategy: Thereafter, for shifting to the next phase of our exper-
imental study, we demonstrated the faster login strategy to all the participants. We observed that
most of them found this really interesting as they sensed of achieving improved login time by following
this strategy.
• Memorization time: We gave participants time for memorizing their option sequences for faster
login and requested them to come back (earliest possible) for login again. We strongly recommend
them to interact more with our scheme for memorizing the option sequences. As mentioned in Section
5.3, let the required time for memorizing the option sequence be denoted as tmem. We measured tmem
on the basis of login attempts.
• Data collection III: After tmem time, on the basis of their return, we asked each participant for
making two attempts for login. We collected the test data again based on the participants’ performance
in our laboratory. The login time and error rate, in the first and second attempt have been identified
as initial and posterior login time and error rate, respectively.
We found that tmem for the participants was obtained no more than 15 login attempts (or 13 days).
Therefore, the experimental study shows that without putting any significant effort, a user can memorize
her option sequence. Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the test results. Moreover, participants’ performance
in Figure 7 suggests that with a small amount of memorization time, login time can be reduced to a great
extent.
Figure 6: Participants’ performance based on the collected test data in Data Collection I and II phases.
After conducting the experiment, we asked the participants to fill up a feedback form to rate our pro-
posed model. The obtained feedback result was found promising and is presented in Table 4.
Choices Agreed participants Percentage (%)
Love to use 47 58.75
Easy to use 11 13.75
Find usable 15 18.75
Bit difficult 5 6.25
Extremely difficult 0 0
Not sure 2 2.5
Table 4: Recorded feedbacks from the 80 participants
Note 5: Discussion in this section shows that the proposed method well satisfies the important HBAT
usability features along with providing very high typo-safety above 96.3%. Also, the experimental study
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Figure 7: Participants’ performance based on the collected test data in Data collection III phase.
refers that after a short time period of 13 days, at max, the users can easily remember their option sequence
(for all the variations of q), and this helps them to finish the login within 8 seconds (with an error rate no
greater than 2.5%). In a nutshell, the overall usability analysis shows that after a small training period,
proposed system can be used like a conventional password based system to meet all the essential usability
criteria of an ideal HBAT.
8. Security analysis
In this section, we show how the proposed scheme meets the essential HBAT security criteria, DoS re-
siliency and flatness.
Security against the DoS attack: For each questionnaire having d alternatives, an attacker can
think of dq probable option sequences for selected q questionnaires by a user. Therefore, the value of n (see
criterion 1 in Section 3) can be represented as dq here. For the default value of d = 4 and k = 20, the
success probability of mounting DoS attack yields to 0.004, 0.001 and 0.0002 for the values of q as 6, 7 and
8, respectively. Therefore, proposed scheme provides robust security against the DoS attack.
Achieving flatness: Figure 1 at the beginning of Section 5 presents the essential properties that a
questionnaire based authentication scheme must satisfy for achieving flatness. Later, in Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2, we have shown that proposed scheme holds all these properties and thus generates a flat list of
sweetwords.
9. Comparative analysis
In our comparative study, we consider two recent studies in (Chakraborty and Mondal, 2017) and (Er-
guler, 2016) as they overcome the limitations of all the previously proposed honeyword generation ap-
proaches. As mentioned earlier, being a legacy-UI based HBAT, proposed method by Imran Erguler tries
to meet the essential criteria of an ideal HBAT (Erguler, 2016). In contrast, in (Chakraborty and Mondal,
2017), authors make an effort to meet those same essential criteria under the light of their proposed modified-
UI based HBAT. We name the proposed methods in (Erguler, 2016) and (Chakraborty and Mondal, 2017)
as EH and NH, respectively.
Previously, we have shown that proposed HABT here explores episodic memory of the users for imposing
no stress on users’ mind. Also, proposed scheme does not influence the answer of a user for any question.
Thus, as suggested in (Juels and Rivest, 2013), proposed method falls under the category of legacy-UI
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HBAT. Based on the presented text so far, Table 5 and 6 compare our scheme with the EH and NH.
Method UI type Stress-on-mind System interference Typo-safe Storage-overhead
EH Legacy No No Yes Yes
NH Modified Yes Yes Yes No
Proposed Legacy No No Yes No ⊗
Table 5: Above table shows comparative view among the methods from usability and storage cost. The symbol ⊗ indicates
“as the additional memory required for storing the honeywords is compensated from the saved memory”.
Method DoS resiliency Tg resilient Ch resilient Rp proof Generate-flat-alternatives Flat
EH Weak No No No N/A No
NH Strong No Yes Yes N/A Yes ⊗
Proposed Strong Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: Above table shows comparative view among the methods from security point of view. Tg and Ch represent targeted
guessing and correlational hazardous, respectively. Rp indicates the recognizable pattern. The symbol ⊗ refers “conditionally
flat only if risk associated with targeted guessing is not considered”.
Comparative study shows that proposed scheme only meets flatness criterion unconditionally. In contrast,
the existing solutions, which are known to provide the best security, cannot even satisfy all criteria for
generating the flat honeywords. Previously, in Section 4, we have shown incapability of EH in providing
adequate security against the DoS attack and hence, Erguler’s approach in (Erguler, 2016) can be categorized
as a weak model in handling the DoS. In (Chakraborty and Mondal, 2017), authors show that NH defends
DoS attack with the very high probability 0.91 and hence NH can be considered as a much stronger security
model to address this threat. Following the same path, Section 7 shows that our proposed model always
resists DoS attack with higher probability than 0.99 and ensures very high security against the DoS attack.
Table 5 shows that proposed method here not only performs well in satisfying all the security parameters
but stands strong from the usability perspective too. In addition to this, it is very important to note that
storing the alternatives by utilizing least possible storage compensates the overheads for incorporating the
honeywords. In fact, in Section 8 we show that adopted storage strategy nullifies the cumulative memory
overheads. Therefore, the discussion in this section reveals that proposed method stands tall compared to
the existing advanced HBAT.
Discussion: In this work, we identify a set of 10 generic questions belonging to the shareable secret life
of the users. The alternatives for b questions have been selected from a group of almost equally probable
elements and hence we claim that proposed method generates much improved flatter list of sweetwords. In
addition to this, all the attributes depicted in Figure 1 are satisfied to reinforce the flatness standard which
is missing in the existing state of arts. From the usability perspective, proposed method does not influence
the users’ answers or force them to remember any additional information. Moreover, usability standard gets
hiked as the users need to recognize (which is much easier than recall) the correct answer based on their
episodic memory. Thus, being legacy-UI, proposed approach meet the flatness criterion.
10. Conclusion
Modern research strongly depends on honeywords to detect the breach at the server side. Though some
significant efforts have been made, existing honeyword generation techniques never address all the issues
affecting flatness. In this study, we have shown that proposed technique overcomes all the limitations and
achieves much improved flatness. In addition to this, our proposal resists the DoS attack with the probability
more than 0.99 to meet all the security parameters. The proposed scheme gets benefited from the usability
perspective as the passwords are formed based on the episodic memory of the users. Also, a high typo-
safety has been assured as a typing mistake sets off a false alarm with lesser probability than 0.03. Along
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with satisfying both the security and usability parameters, our method provides an efficient way for storing
the alternatives, which greatly helps in nullifying the cumulative storage overhead for incorporating the
honeywords. In future, we will try to identify more generic questions from the shareable secret life of the
users and form more uniformly distributed groups for selecting the alternatives. Nonetheless, we believe
that this paper shows an efficient approach for generating the honeywords which will further benefit the
security community from their use.
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